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SUBSIDIARITY, SOCIETY, AND ENTITLEMENTS:
UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATION
REV. ROBERT A. Sinco*
"The principle of subsidiarity is opposed to all forms
of collectivism. It sets limits for state intervention." Cate-
chism of the Catholic Church, para. 1885.
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of subsidiarity derives primarily from the natu-
ral law tradition and Roman Catholic social teaching. Its implica-
tions are profound: it places limits on the rightful duties of the
state and imposes obligations on lower order institutions such as
the community, church, family, and individual, and it obliges
those lower orders to fulfill certain moral and practical functions
essential to the functioning of a well-ordered and free society.
Subsidiarity is not some new notion that needs to be
reinvented; rather it lies at the core of the Western concept of
the free and virtuous social order. It is a crucial, if still largely
tacit, part of our common understanding of the components of a
free and virtuous society: power and authority reside among the
many units that are most capable of carrying out their functions
properly within the context of human rights and human
freedom.
The principle has found its political expression in the Amer-
ican concept of federalism, and, in Europe, the concept has
become a critical part of the debate on the relations between
nations and the central authority of the European Community.
In these political contexts, the principle has been invoked by the
partisans of limited government over centralized management of
people, states, and nations.
As a philosophical notion, it provides an intellectual frame-
work for the social order rooted in the Christian faith and
human liberty. As a concept within Catholic social teaching, it is
a fundamental principle that stands alongside the dignity of the
human person and the social nature of human life.' It does not
* President of the Acton Institute
1. Michael Novak, cited in WALTER BLOCK, THE U.S. BISHOPS AND THEIR
Ciurics: AN EcONOMIC AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIvE 66 (1986). Though the term
subsidiarity is generally associated with Catholic social teaching, the concept is
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and cannot give fixed answers to the burning questions of the
day, such as: how much should the state tax, to what extent
should religion and public policy be separate, how generous
should the social assistance state be or should it even exist?
These questions still remain within the realm of prudence and
circumstance.
As Franz H. Mueller reminds us "the Church calls upon her
members to make their own prudential decisions within the
framework of what is generally demanded by faith and morals.
She marks the boundaries and puts up signposts, but she does
not ordinarily prescribe the route to be taken to the goal in ques-
tion."2 In the area of policy and the moral obligations of individ-
uals in public life, subsidiarity highlights many such boundaries
and signposts, and provides an overall framework for evaluating
how consistent social structures are with Catholic teaching.
II. WHAT IS SUBSIDIRrIY?
The thesis of the subsidiarity principle is at once simple,
deeply meaningful, and socially significant. In quoting from
Centesimus Annus, the Catechism of the Catholic Church states it as
follows: "A community of a higher order should not interfere in
the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the
latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need
and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of
society, always with the view to the common good."3
The concept posits a hierarchy of social action and responsi-
bility that begins with the claim of primacy for the smallest units
in society, including community associations, families, and indi-
viduals. These groups have. the first responsibility for caring for
their own needs and for those with whom they come in contact.
On the occasion when they fail to function as they should, higher
social structures, beginning with the closest level of government,
are permitted to temporarily assume responsibility for those
by no means limited to it. The Protestant tradition also embraces a notion of
"sphere sovereignty" which delineates the transcendent, ethical, and practical
limits of state action. See generally HERBERT SCHLOSSBERG, IDOLS FOR
DESTRUCTION: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND ITS CONFRONTATION wrrH AMERICAN
SocIETY 177-228 (1983); Doug Bandow, BEYOND GOOD INTENTIONS: A BIBLICAL
VIEW OF POLITICS (1988).
2. FRANz H. MUELLER, THE CHURCH AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION 15 (1984).
3. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, PARA. 1883 (1994) (hereinafter
CATEcHISM). For an excellent treatment of what is meant by the term "common
good," and the analogous term "social justice," see MICHAEL NoVAK, THE
CATHOLIC ETHIc AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 62-88 (1993); MIcHAEL NovAK,
FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 75 (1989).
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same functions, but only for the duration that the higher orders
can perform the job more effectively than the lower ones. If
higher-order intervention takes place in absence of systemic fail-
ure, lower orders are forcibly divested of what they do best, the
common good of all suffers, and the principle of subsidiarity has
been violated.
The word subsidiarity is derived from the Latin subsidium,
meaning to help or to aid. This root implies that a permanent
state of usurpation of one function by another order (e.g., the
government, and not the family, rearing children) is to be ruled
out. Higher orders can intervene in the affairs of the lower ones
only as auxiliary aids, and even then only under certain, well-
defined circumstances. Moreover, the authority between spheres
of influence and power within society are internally legitimate
and not merely derivative. The state, for example, is better
suited to the provision of national defense than to the provision
of income security; the authority for the state to provide such
national security is not derived from other institutions.
In Rerum novarum, for example, Pope Leo XIII argued that
"man is older than the state,"4 and the family is anterior in idea
and fact to civil society. Intervention is only warranted if a family
"finds itself in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and without
prospect of help," or if "there occur grave disturbances of mutual
rights" within the family.5 Even so, the family exercises authority
which is suitable to its structure and place in society, and that
authority is neither delegated to nor approved by higher authori-
ties. As Johannes Messner explains, subsidiarity does not imply
that society is bound to provide certain social services in all possi-
ble contingencies, but rather illuminates the division of compe-
tencies among social institutions.6
Societies which adhere to the principle of subsidiarity create
and maintain a bottom-up social structure, with the departure
point being families and community relations. Higher orders are
resources of last resort only. "The principle of subsidiarity," says
the Catechism, "is opposed to all forms of collectivism. It sets lim-
its for state intervention."7 The purpose of the principle is not to
isolate spheres of influence within society, but through the exer-
cise of human freedom and justice to harmonize "the relations
between individuals and societies."' Paradoxically, this harmony,
4. Pope Leo XIII, RERUM NOVARuM, para. 7 (1891), reprinted in 2 THE
PAPAL ENCYCaUICALS 241 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981).
5. Id. at para. 11.
6. JOHANN'S MESSNER, SocIt ETmcs (1958).
7. CATECHISM, supra note 3, at para. 1885.
8. Id.
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though giving primacy to lower orders, "tends toward the estab-
lishment of true international order."9 As Richard Neuhaus
argues, the principle means that "the state is subsidiary to the
society in service, as it is also derived from the society in its moral
legitimacy."' °
Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity speaks to moral issues
first. It suggests that people closest to the problem at hand are
the ones with the strongest moral claim to finding a solution. To
empower higher authorities as anything but second-best solu-
tions or even last resorts endangers the rights and liberties of
those who are most affected. The subsidiarity principle also
embodies the practical point that those closest to the problem
have the strongest interest in seeing that the problem is solved
most competently. The application of this practical side goes
beyond social structure, even speaking to issues of business man-
agement. As Michael Novak has argued, "the more a corporation
embodies the principle of subsidiarity in its organization, the
closer to its work force it becomes."1' The same is true of other
institutional structures like the family.' 2
A society respecting the principle of subsidiarity contrasts
with a top-down model of society in which the central govern-
ment presumes to have the primary role in ordering people's
lives. The central government only delegates power when lower
orders will carry out functions in accordance with the govern-
ment's overall plan. "Just as it is wrong to withdraw from the
individual and commit to a group what private enterprise and
industry can accomplish," writes Pius XI in the Quadragesimo
Anno--this century's most famous statement of the subsidiarity
principle-"so too it is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance
of right order for a larger and higher association to arrogate to
itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and
lower societies. This is a fundamental principle of social philoso-
phy, unshaken and unchangeable."'"
9. Id.
10. RicHARDJ. NEUHAUs, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD 243 (1992).
11. MICHAEL NoVAK, THE SpIRrr OF DEMOcRATic CAPrrAL[SM 178 (1982).
12. "Much of our family trouble is not so much the fault of civilization as
of deliberate policies undertaken by Western governments. The state is, after
all, the invention of families and not the other way around. For several
centuries, the state has committed itself to whittling away at the powers and
functions of the family, while demanding ever higher standards of
performance." THOMAS FLEMING, THE PoLrrmcs OF HuMAN NAmURE 128 (1988).
13. Pope Pius XI, QUADRAGESimO ANNo, para. 79 (1931) reprinted in 3 THE
PAPAL ENCYCLICALS, supra note 4, at 415.
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Experience teaches us that the top-down model operates at
the expense of practicality, creativity, and liberty.14 As Pope Pius
XII said, "[t]he conception . .. which assigns to the State unlim-
ited authority is not only pernicious to the internal life of the
nation, to its prosperity, and to the orderly increase of its well-
being; it also damages relations between peoples, because it
breaks the unity of international society, it rips out the founda-
tions of the value of the rights of the people."" "Excessive inter-
vention by the state," adds the Catechism in this same tradition,
"can threaten personal freedom and initiative." 6 The purpose
of the subsidiarity principle, in contrast, is to establish a way of
thinking about social life that has a high regard for the freedom
of individuals, families, and communities; for creativity in
responding to particular needs and situations; and for the best
performance of social tasks like caring for society's weakest
members.
III. WHY SUBSIDIARITY IS IMPORTANT
The first step in understanding the idea of subsidiarity is to
acknowledge its existence and recognize its importance, rather
than dismissing it as contrary to some other postulate of Chris-
tian ethics. AsJ. Brian Benestad says, "taking a look at the princi-
ple of subsidiarity is a good way to begin the study of Catholic
social teaching."17 But this is evidently a step many religious
social thinkers are unwilling to take. A brief look at the vast liter-
ature on ethics and Church social teaching shows little interest
on the part of intellectuals in consistently applying the principle.
The tendency is rather to postulate the centrality of some worth-
while goal-for example, universal charity or universal rights-
and to pursue it without regard to the proper ordering of society
in bringing about this goal.
Both conservatives and liberals can be faulted in this regard.
For example, a collection entitled One Hundred Years of Catholic
Social Thought contains discussions of all aspects of social policy
and social justice with a decided bias towards government solu-
tions, but nary a word about subsidiarity or the moral imperative
14. See generally DOUG BANDOW, THE POLITICS OF ENVw: STATISM AS
THEOLOGY (1994). For a specific application of this observation to the effect of
intervention and state planning on labor markets, see RIcHARD VEDDER &
LOwELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1993).
15. MUELLER, supra note 2, at 121.
16. CATECHISM, supra note 3 at para. 1883.
17. J. Brian Benestad, Virtue in Catholic Social Teaching, in PRIVATE VIRTUE
AND PUBLIC PoLicy- CATHOLIC THOUGHT AND NATIONAL LIFE 3 (1990).
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of limiting centralized power in economic or political life. 8 It is
as if the concept simply was not relevant to the discussion,
whereas it should be featured in any overview of Catholic social
thought. From the libertarian rightist perspective, in an other-
wise thoughtful discussion, Walter Block argues that the notion
of subsidiarity ought to be dispensed with altogether on grounds
that it appears to be in conflict with absolute rights.' 9
Charles Curran's standard text, Direction in Catholic Social Eth-
ics, mentions the issue of subsidiarity. At the same time, he offers
a number of peculiar interpretations and applications of it. First,
subsidiarity is disparaged as "a deductive, abstract approach" that
prevented German Catholic liberals from understanding the
merits of child labor laws.20 Second, it is seen as underscoring,
but not "absolutizing," the right to procreate; yet it turns out that
"in practice this means that larger communities including the
state may have to intervene in population control if this is
deemed necessary."2" Third, subsidiarity teaches us to "avoid
overcentralization" when we get around to socializing all
medicine and health care; yet there is no hint provided as to how
this would be possible. 2 And fourth, subsidiarity is approved as a
model for bottom-up "political action" on the model pioneered
by socialist activist Saul Alinsky.2" In none of these cases does the
author take the concept as a serious effort to delimit state power
and thus fails to apply it with attention to its definition or authen-
tic meaning.
Rodger Charles, S.J. and Drostan MacLaran, in their 1982
treatise The Social Teaching of Vatican II, provide only one isolated
mention of subsidiarity. 24 The subject does not arise at all in the
section evaluating the relative merits of capitalism versus commu-
nism. That particular section features this gem, made all the
18. JOHN A. COLEMAN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT (1991).
19. WALTER BLOCK, THE U.S. BISHOPS AND THEIR CRITICS: AN ECONOMIC
AND ETICAL PERSPECTIVE 66 (1986). Block has also made a category mistake.
The purpose of the doctrine of subsidiarity is not to specify what are and are
not human rights, but rather to alert us to the advantages of decentralizing the
enforcement of rights and to warn of the dangers of centralizing the
enforcement of rights, authentic or artificial, in the hands of the central
government.
20. CHARLES E. CURRAN, DIRECTIONS IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS 85
(1985).
21. Id. at 231.
22. Id. at 274.
23. Id. at 167.
24. RODGER CHARLES & DROSTAN MAcLsN, THm SOCIAL TEACHING OF
VATICAN II 209 (1982).
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more odd when read in a post-Communist context: "comparison
between the economic performance of free enterprise and the
Communist system is extraordinarily difficult. . . . [But] the
achievements of the Soviet system are in overall terms stagger-
ingly impressive."25  Moreover, "given some of the positive
aspects of the Soviet economic system, it might be just as easy, or
perhaps even easier, for the Church to live with it than with a
free enterprise structure which encourages permissiveness, anar-
chy or gross social injustice .. ."" It is my contention that a
proper application of the subsidiarity principle would have at
least tempered these judgments on the application of Catholic
social teaching to totalitarian regimes, thus avoiding the embar-
rassment of such faulty analysis.
The trouble with ignoring the crucial concept of the social
structure of subsidiarity is that the tendency to universalize can
quickly lead to absurdity and error. For example, it is right and
proper that all children be cared for and immoral and unjust
that even one be neglected. Can we conclude from this that
there would be no Christian objection to empowering a global
government authority to take away the rights and privileges of
the family to bring about such a goal? Or are there guideposts to
be obeyed in assigning the implementation of normative postu-
lates regarding rights and duties? Merely asking the question
highlights the dangers of overlooking the issue of subsidiarity
and its application to social, legal, and economic structures.
Why is it that so many Catholic intellectuals are inclined to
overlook the concept of subsidiarity and its traditional under-
standing and implications? The answer may lie in the tendency
to conflate the universality of the faith and the universality of
social organization. There exists a tendency to import such abso-
lutist categories of ethics and morals-and their applications to
such ideas as rights and obligations-into the application of the
Church's social teaching. Thus, there may be a universal right to
minimum material subsistence; but the universalist frame of
mind is tempted to conclude that there must be a universal
agency empowered to guarantee this right, just as there is a uni-
versal Church to administer other rights of the faithful, such as
the sacraments. But this is a profound categorical error. The
question of how and under what institutional arrangements these
rights and obligations should be discharged and enforced are
25. Id. at 294.
26. Id. at 295.
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really distinct questions.27 The overwhelming bulk of modem
academic renderings of Catholic social teaching concentrate on
what constitutes a human right to the exclusion of how it should
best be guaranteed and secured.
I am not proposing that subsidiarity should be considered
the only or even the first principle of social ethics. Indeed, John
Paul II also elevates the idea of solidarity in Centesimus Annus.
This is the proposition that the social dimension of public life
must never be overlooked and that social institutions should fos-
ter social cooperation within and among groups. As one exam-
ple, we find that the state must place "certain limits on the
autonomy of the parties who determine working conditions" and
ensure that there is "the necessary minimum support for the
unemployed worker."2" What the Pope proposes is that there be
an interactive relationship between state, society, and economy.
Economic and political systems cannot by themselves assure a
healthy society; neither can society be expected to be healthy
absent a coordinative relationship with the economy and the
state. Yet the notion of solidarity can only make sense and be
realized in the context of subsidiarity. The primary role the state
plays in assuring solidarity is to provide a "juridical framework"
for society and economy, and not take over their proper func-
tions." Expansive state intervention can harm this cooperative
relationship as much as businessmen who pay no mind to the
rule of law or the needs of society.
By simply getting the debate going-and not dismissing the
subsidiarity principle as a mere contingent recommendation-
we can lift the debate on social teaching to a higher plane. We
can go beyond what we agree on-notions such as the moral
obligation to be charitable-to a much more fruitful area. We
can begin to discuss the concrete realities of social and political
life, and move beyond abstractions that have very little bearing
on the most contentious areas of modem political debate.
27. The example provided above is directed at the collectivist tendencies
of modern liberalism, but it could as easily be directed at the libertarian variety
of universal rights. Block, see n.19, supra, would institute a regime of absolute
and undefiled property rights, but perceives no dangers that may be associated
with the attempt at the universal enforcement of those rights through a single
agency. Robert Nozick's withering and brilliant critique of John Rawls and
collectivism generally is weakened because it does not raise the issue of
subsidiarity or the proper level of government at which universal rights should
be recognized. See ROBERT Nozicy, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
28. Pope John Paul II, CENTEsimus ArNus, para. 15 (1991), reprinted in
CATHOLIc SociAL THOUGHT: THE DocuMENTARY HERITAGE (David J. O'Brien &
Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
29. NEUHAUS, supra note 10, at 250.
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IV. OBJECTIONS TO SUBSIDIARITY
A number of critics have raised objections to the traditional
application of the principle as I have so far explained it and
applied it. Some thinkers have said the traditional application is
wrongheaded: the principle of subsidiarity is as much a call for
government to correct social and market failure as it is a caution
to the dangers of centralized government power.3" But this is a
difficult proposition to justify. The clear meaning of the sub-
sidiarity principle is to limit the powers and responsibilities
assumed by the higher orders of society. In nearly every occasion
in which the principle has been invoked in the last one hundred
years of official Catholic social teaching, it is in the context of
limiting the uses of power.3 " It is also true, of course, that the
lower orders are by no means relieved of their responsibilities.
Some may say that modern society is too complex to be
ordered in this fashion; economic and social complexity requires
overarching social management. 32 But this turns a valid point on
its head. It is indeed true that society is vastly more complex and
diverse than it once was. Rather than making the case for more
state intervention, this merely underscores the inability of the
state to undertake competent intervention at all. This insight is
carefully worked out in the writings of F.A. Hayek and, in particu-
lar, his insight regarding the use of knowledge in society.33 In
Hayek's understanding, the information necessary for the well
functioning of society is necessarily dispersed among individuals
and the various organic units of society. It is not practicable for
all the knowledge necessary for society to work to be accumu-
lated in central units of society, much less in the minds of single
individuals presuming to plan society.3 4 The argument was first
deployed against socialism, but in its development it grew to
30. This appears to be the central error-leaving aside its innumerable
failures to come to terms with technical economic issues-with the U.S.
Bishops' letter on the economy that appeared in 1984. U.S. Bishops' Pastoral
Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, 14 ORIGINS 337 (1984). For
a response to this error, see Michael Novak, The Bishops and the Poor,
COMMENTARY, May 1985, at 20-22. For a greatly improved approach on the part
of the bishops, see the 1996 statement Catholic Framework for Economic Life and
my discussion of it, Robert A. Sirico, The Bishops'Big Economic Tent, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 10, 1996, at A22.
31. Benestad, supra note 17, at 30-32.
32. Again, the U.S. Catholic Bishops deployed this argument in 1984.
For a response, see Paul Heyne, The U.S. Catholic Bishops and the Pursuit ofJustice,
(Cato Institute, Wash. D.C.), Mar. 5, 1985.
33. F.A. Hayek, The Uses of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND THE
ECONOMIC ORDER 77-91 (1972).
34. Id.
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impact our conception of how social democratic and even mar-
ket-oriented societies function. Hayek's insight regarding the
necessary dispersion of knowledge helps guard against the temp-
tation of the higher and political orders to take over and eventu-
ally swamp lower and private orders within nations, and points to
the social loss and eventual disintegration that results if they do.
Another common objection to this understanding of sub-
sidiarity relies on the fact that we live in a multicultural society in
which common values can no longer be taken for granted. This
fact supposedly makes a free and decentralized social order
impractical. Subsidiarity only works when society as whole is
united by common values and shared religious understanding;
insofar as these conditions are not realized, centralized authority
must take a more expanded role.
Here again, we witness an effort to transform a major
strength of the subsidiarity principle into an objection to it. The
more diverse a society is in terms of its demographic, religious,
and normative makeup, the more its functions must be devolved
to the lower orders where problems can be understood and dealt
with on their own terms. A centralized authority lacks the infor-
mation necessary to proscribe solutions for a diverse society; it
must of necessity treat citizens and community as relatively
homogeneous.3 5 Let's ask this question, for example: if a single
society is composed of communities of very different religious
orientations, is a central religious authority emanating from the
state more or less viable than it would be in a society composed
of members of a single faith? The answer should be obvious:
diversity in religion requires freedom of religious practice, and
the conflicts that arise between groups should be solved at the
lowest possible level (that is, if we value freedom over forced con-
formity).6 So it is with other aspects of a nation's life, whether
familial or economic. The more heterogeneous the society's
makeup, the more the subsidiarity principle needs to be recog-
nized and practiced. 7
35. For a discussion of these matters in the Hayekian tradition, see
MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, RATIONALISM IN PoLmIcs AND OTHER ESSAYS 6-42, 384-406
(1991).
36. On the organic nature of socio-religious development, see F.A.
HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRoRS OF SOCIALISM 135-40 (1988).
37. Lord Acton, that great champion of liberty above power, articulated a
certain advantage of cultural and social heterogeneity. "[T]he forces that
prevail in society tend to control the state. Where one force altogether prevails,
there is no way of checking it. For it is by the combination of others that we
prevent the predominance of one." JoHN E mucH EDWARD DALBERo-AcTON,
EssAYs IN RELIGION, POLmTcs, AND MORA=rlY 493 (1988).
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V. SUBSIDIARITY AND EVANGELIZATION
The subsidiarity principle deeply informs religious concerns.
If we can agree that values and morals make up the indispensable
bulwark of sustaining a viable social order, and that the religious
traditions of the West are the essential framework in which to
understand and fully express those values and morals, we need
some transmission mechanism to impart religious values to those
in society who do not accept them due to unfortunate circum-
stances (alienation, rejection, dependency, etc.). That mecha-
nism is evangelization: bringing the good news of faith to people
and cultures and inspiring them towards belief and the practice
of faith in their lives. The subsidiarity principle helps in this
regard because the people most capable of evangelizing non-
believers are the believers closest to them.
The loss of the evangelical function of the lower orders has
been one of the most costly aspects of the modern tendency
toward centralization. If the principle of subsidiarity is ignored
by society, the teaching authority of the family and the Church is
not exercised as well as it could be. This means that values and
morals essential to the thriving of civilization are not transmitted
to new generations.
There are few better opportunities for imparting values and
faith than family intervention by churches and community
groups. Through personal contact with the poor, weak, and dis-
advantaged, the Church can present a more authentic and credi-
ble witness for Christ in their lives. Part of what has been
perceived as a decline in the vibrancy of the witness of the
Church in recent years is due to a loss of a sense of mission. This
is due to losing (or surrendering) to the central government the
crucial function of caring for families in need. 8
As it stands under current policy, the Church is often
crowded out by the federal government. Consider abortion.
With Roe v. Wade39 the Supreme Court invalidated the laws of
every state and locality in the country and imposed a uniform
code which effectively legalized the systemic and arbitrary
38. For an illuminating discussion, see BRIGrrrE BERGER & PETER L.
BERGER, THE WAR OVER THE FAMIL: CAPTURING THE MIDDLE GROUND (1983).
"A general direction of public policy should be to turn to other mediating
structures, if individual families are no longer able to cope, before there is
recourse to professional or bureaucratic agencies of 'service delivery.'" Id. at
214.
39. 410 U.S. 13 (1973).
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destruction of the life of the unborn.4' In doing so, the Court
not only violated the principle of subsidiarity, it codified into our
nation's law the idea that courts and government, not commu-
nity and Church, are to be the arbiters of the structure of family
ethics. The result has been to enshrine the secular principles of
sexual license and family breakup at the expense of traditional
morality and marital commitment.
The loss of values and morals, occasioned by the transfer of
rightful authority to higher and less capable orders, is the pri-
mary cultural, political, and moral characteristic of our times.4"
To regain those values and morals requires a greater cultural
appreciation of the virtue of subsidiarity and a greater institu-
tional recognition of the central place it must have in the right
ordering of the economic and political culture.
This is most clearly seen in the field of education, a major
issue in contemporary political controversies. As education has
become more public and centralized, it has tended to proceed
without the benefit of the moral lessons of subsidiarity. As a
result, the quality of schools has declined, and the traditional
evangelical role of education has been pushed to the margins,
replaced by other goals such as socialization and acculturation
according to the designs of secular-state authorities. An interest-
ing contrast to this dominant structure is the Catholic parochial
school, which has had a better record in every area that secular
authorities deem important-including the education of people
from all socio-economic groups-while also maintaining the cru-
cial responsibilities of meeting the spiritual needs of students.42
Once the education of children was entirely a function of
the local community and the states, but is now, to an alarming
extent, a social task undertaken by the federal government. It is
not only the constant and looming presence of the federal
Department of Education which is objectionable. It is the very
idea that federal dollars would have such a major impact over
something as intimate, family-related and community-related as
the education of children. Whether we move towards a voucher
system or a radical decentralization of education, the primary
goal of a social policy based on the subsidiarity principle must be
to give parents and local communities a greater degree of con-
40. For an introductory discussion of this landmark decision of 1973, see
STEPHEN M. KRASON, ABORTION, PoLrncs, MoRALrrV AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1984).
41. ROBERT NISBET, THE PRESENT AGE: PROGRESS AND ANARCHY IN MODERN
AMERICA 40-83 (1988).
42. ANTHONY BRYK ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD
(1993).
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trol over their children's education. And given the unparalleled
success of the Catholic Church in providing education in the
United States, 43 Catholic schools must necessarily play a large
role-whether institutionally or by providing tested models-in
the future of an education system based on the idea of
subsidiarity.
The subsidiarity principle also informs our view of the gov-
ernment's relation to family policy, making the centralization of
the last thirty years indefensible. Far from having corrected for
grave problems in society's lower orders, the higher orders have
intervened and usurped the prerogatives of the family and com-
munity to the detriment of all. In the case of economic need and
other forms of social deprivation, if these problems had been
addressed at the local level, the needs of families would have
been met apart from the materialist assumption at the root of the
modern welfare state.
"The family," says the Catechism, "is the original cell of social
life,"44 and the essential bulwark of a free and well-ordered soci-
ety. The family serves as the crucial means of acculturation and
the key to transmitting values from generation to generation,
and it is the family that enables us to make good use of freedom.
Yet contemporary public policy has served to both interfere with
and assume the functions of the family, with disastrous
consequences.
VI. SUBSIDIARITY AND CHAnIrr
The primary non-military source of state expansionism this
century has been in the area of welfare provision.4 5 Every West-
ern industrialized democracy has erected massive social assist-
ance states that are hugely expensive, largely unpopular among
the paying groups, yet tightly guarded by the recipients and
administrators of the system. The principle of subsidiarity speaks
directly to both the morality and the practicality of such systems,
and renders a generally negative verdict.
Of course, every society includes a large and ever-changing
group of people who are not in a position to be completely
independent, whether physically, economically, mentally, or spir-
itually. They require the help of others. Children, the elderly,
the sick and infirm, those who suffer mental and spiritual debili-
tations, those who are victims of unfortunate circumstances in
family and professional life-they all require social aid. Many of
43. Id.
44. CATEcHISM, supra note 3, at para. 2207.
45. BANDOW, supra note 14, at 297-314.
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these people are also poor, even if that is more often a symptom
rather than a cause of their problem. Whether it is poverty or
something else, society does not take the attitude once predomi-
nant in the ancient world that the weak may or may not be wor-
thy of attention. Today, largely as a result of religious
inspiration, societies recognize the moral obligation to intervene,
to have compassion, to act charitably, and to give charitably to
others.
There is a Christian basis for this understanding. But the
idea is also deeply entrenched in the secular world as well. The
philosopher John Rawls is usually cited in defense of social struc-
tures designed to help those in need. Rawls asks us to put our-
selves behind a "veil of ignorance"46 and imagine that we could
be any person in society, whether a well-paid and secure corpo-
rate executive or an unskilled person without a home who is
unsure of where his next meal will come from. It is an interest-
ing mental exercise that suggests everyone would choose, behind
the veil, to seek the kind of society where no matter where any-
one ended up in the socio-economic and generational system, he
or she could be assured of basic rights, to life, to liberty, and to
the pursuit of happiness.
Society does indeed need structures to insure that this is the
case, and surely a social safety net is essential. The American
response to this challenge has varied from the colonial times to
the present. For several generations, Americans have viewed
charity and welfare as proscribing a response from the federal
welfare state-a vast apparatus consisting of more than a hun-
dred programs, involving millions of workers in tax-funded
bureaucracies, costing as much as $350 billion per year47 and
designed mainly to enhance the economic standing of the recipi-
ents. And though Americans are a very charitable people, the
sheer size and scope of the federal effort has led many to believe
that the social safety net is sufficiently secure; thanks to govern-
ment intervention, some believe that the care of those in need
requires very little private attention.
At the same time, there is wide public recognition of the
omnipresent and multifarious failures of the welfare state, fail-
ures which have caused political movements from the right and
left to seek fundamental reform. The social safety net, despite
the best intentions of its contemporary architects and defenders,
46. JoHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JuSTICE 136-37 (1971). For a critique of
the policy implications usually drawn from Rawlsian analysis, see Nozcx, supra
note 27.
47. BA~Now, supra note 45, at 315-26.
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is more accurately appraised as a bureaucratic machine that is
fueled by coercion and compulsion. Many people, with
entrenched interests in preserving the present system, will resist
this conclusion, but the average citizen is not among them. Judg-
ing from present trends in public philosophy, the general direc-
tion of reform will be away from dependence toward
independence, away from the center to local communities, away
from government solutions and toward private ones.
As the political culture further debates reform of the welfare
system-a process which is likely to last for many years-we must
also reflect on the ends we seek to achieve and the means we
must choose to bring about the appropriate ends. The concept
of subsidiarity must be part of this debate. The gospel tells us
that the needy cannot be overlooked, and indeed must be served,
in every society. A social order should be judged by the way it
treats those most in need, who are so by no fault of their own.
Likewise the system of economics-meaning the manner in
which social resources are used and allocated-must reflect this
proposition.4" Our society has been so infused with this ethic,
which is essentially Western, to such an extent that most every-
one agrees, including social philosophers and theologians. Peo-
ple must not be allowed to be left out, forgotten by society,
denied opportunity, or ignored by the economic system, espe-
cially not by those who have been blessed with wealth.
But at this point, the consensus falls apart. About the ulti-
mate ends, people agree. The dispute is about the means. Is it
appropriate to deal with poverty and suffering solely through the
coercive apparatus of the welfare state, the philosophy of statism
and socialist democracy, or some other arrangement of govern-
ment intrusion? Or is the natural order of liberty, created by free
people within the overall structure of an entrepreneurial econ-
omy, exercising compassion with their communities and locali-
ties, to be preferred as the primary-and normative-means of
help?
If people are to help the poor, and establish an authentic
social safety net that really works, they must do more than will it
with their hearts. The federal government has not done much
for those most in need in present times, while the harm it has
caused is incalculable.49 In fact, most of the important improve-
ments in the lives of the least well-off in society have been a result
48. See MlCHAEL NovAF, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 75-107
(1989).
49. Robert Rector, Understanding the Welfare Reform Bill INrELEcruAL
AmMm NrON, Nov.-Dec., 1996, at 14.
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of two major forces: first, a general improvement in the standard
of living resulting from free exchange in markets combined with
entrepreneurial initiative; and second, from private charity exer-
cised on a local level by people who know and understand the
needs of those who are genuinely in need of help. This manner
of helping the poor and promoting the common good gets far
less attention than other options. Because this method of social
improvement is not designed by anyone in particular, or embod-
ied in a particular program or agency, it tends to get overlooked.
Yet the most effective remedies for human suffering are most
often overlooked. Private solutions may not have the glamour of
a new 'lobs program" or be featured in press conferences, much
less touted by politicians, but they are ultimately more effective.5"
VII. SUBS1IAITY AND ENTrrLEMENTS
Since the New Deal, the term "entitlements" has come to
define the policies of the social assistance state. It is a perpetual
promise by the state to provide a stream of income and other
resources for those who qualify by virtue of their lowly socio-eco-
nomic status. To provide this income stream in the form of wel-
fare requires a perpetual promise to draw from the private pool
of wealth, from producers, via the tax system (or the hidden tax
system of debt accumulation and inflation). It should be obvious
that the notion of an "entitlement" is directly contradictory to
the subsidiarity principle. In this case, the state is not interven-
ing when other lower orders have failed, but assuming that fail-
ure is a constant pattern of the lower orders, and robbing them
of the opportunity to provide better care for those who need.
Indeed, with an "entitlement," the competence or incompetence
of the lower orders in accomplishing the task of charity is not
even an issue.
The passage in the U.S. of the 1996 Welfare Act,5 ' which
placed some time limits on the receipt of welfare and devolved
the administration of the welfare state to smaller governments,
means that the term "entitlement" will no longer be part of the
American policy vocabulary. But whether the term is used or
not, there can be no question that the spirit of the entitlement
mentality will continue to exist. A good measure of whether the
central government is truly allowing lower orders to reengage
themselves in the provision of charity, and not be interfered with
50. For a wide ranging discussion of these issues, see HENRY HAzLr, THE
CONQUEST OF POVERTY (1973).
51. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
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by the central state is a simple one: the budget. Under the 1996
Welfare Act, welfare spending is slated to continue to rise in
accord with conventional budget projections. 2
In a recent invocation of the principle of subsidiarity, Pope
John Paul II writes of the failure of the modern welfare state.
"Malfunctions and defects in the Social Assistance State," he
writes in Centesimus Annus, "are the result of an inadequate
understanding of the tasks proper to the State.""3 The Pope
points to a practical cost of violating subsidiarity: the politiciza-
tion of society. Public agencies proliferate at the expense of
smaller communities of charity and enterprise, producing what
he calls a "bureaucratic way of thinking."
The cost of the welfare state has not only been economic to
the extent that bureaucracy always grows at the expense of a
dynamic exchange economy. The cost is also moral, because the
welfare state pursues its tasks in terms of a moral code increas-
ingly alien from traditional Christian tenets. For example, the
very concept of a welfare "entitlement" runs contrary to the scrip-
tural understanding of aiding the poor: helping others is a moral
duty that springs from spiritual commitment and is not essen-
tially exercised through coercion or government mandates. The
modern, central state has proven itself incapable of distinguish-
ing between the deserving and the undeserving poor, and
between aid that fosters independence and moral development
from that which reinforces a dependency mindset and moral
nihilism. The distinction between the two can only be revealed
to those in need through the evangelization function of the
Church and community.
Today, those called to practice charity and to exercise con-
cerns for others find themselves living in a society that has insuf-
ficient respect for the principle of subsidiarity. While it is true
that the central government has crowded out the lower orders
and has restricted opportunities for charity, that in no way
relieves us of our moral obligations. The Catechism is without
qualification when it insists that "there are many families who are
at times incapable" of caring for the young, the old, the sick, the
disabled, and the poor. "It devolves then on other persons, other
families, and, in a subsidiary way, society to provide for their
needs."54
When Aristotle considered the merits and demerits of collec-
tive ownership, he pointed out that the first casualty of common
52. Rector, supra note 49.
53. CENTEsMs ANNUS, supra note 28, at para. 48.
54. CATEcHISM, supra note 3, at para. 2208.
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ownership is charity. "The abolition of private property," he
writes in The Politics, "will mean that no man will be seen to be
liberal and no man will ever do any act of liberality; for it is in the
use of articles of property that liberality is practiced."55 One of
the many tragic effects of the welfare state has been to drain pri-
vate capital that could have gone toward helping others invest in
future prosperity. But it has had a more fundamental cost in
draining what Wilhelm R6pke has called "the secret spring of a
healthy society, i.e. the sense of responsibility":
The more the state takes care of us, the less shall we feel
called upon to take care of ourselves and our family, and
the less we feel inclined to do so, the less we can expect
help from others whose natural duty it would be to assist us
when in need, the members of our family, our neighbors,
our friends, or our colleagues. We have at last found in the
state a secular God whom, like the lilies in the field, we
may burden with all our cares, and at the same time all
true charity which can only thrive on spontaneity and read-
iness to help . . . will die Out.56
Among the most frustrating and deep-rooted problems of
our society today is illegitimacy, especially as it occurs among
teenagers. Illegitimacy-which has increased more than 400%
since 1960 57-is the most problematic contributor to the break-
down of the two-parent family. This trend is tearing the fabric of
our society.58 This alone demonstrates how it is critical that we
take radical measures to restore the family unit as the organic
extension of the natural order of private life-absent the involve-
ment of the centralized state. According to the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, the family must be reclaimed as the fundamental unit of
society. While there are certainly thousands of stories of heroic
single-mothers, most of these women would admit that their con-
dition is not ideal. Choosing their lot in life from behind the
Rawlsian veil, they would see the state of dependency and the
social devastation which follows it as entirely undesirable. There
is no reason to celebrate illegitimacy and family breakdown; it is
probably the most tragic consequence of centralized, state-run,
materialistic approaches to poverty and helplessness.
55. ARISTOTLE, TnE PoLmcs 1263b7 (Hugh Tredennick trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 1976).
56. Wn.sM RoPn,, Tr SOcIAL CmsIS OF OUR TiME 164 (1992).
57. WilliamJ. Bennet, Quantifying America's Decline, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
1993, at A12.
58. BANDow, supra note 14, at 239-40.
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Illegitimacy is not merely a technical problem, but a moral
one. To the extent that the federal government encourages out-
of-wedlock births with ill-conceived policies, it is morally culpa-
ble. When the government subsidizes out-of-wedlock births, it
removes the structure of incentives and disincentives that exist in
the social and economic system of every society that serves to dis-
courage promiscuity and irresponsibility.
When dealing with the illegitimacy problem, the very nature
of the entitlement state, with its bureaucratic policies, precludes
it from helping individuals become responsible parents and citi-
zens. Indeed, it takes a much deeper understanding of human
needs to encourage this. The very size and scope of the welfare
state, moreover, lessens the reason for people to become person-
ally involved in problems like illegitimacy. It lessens their contact
with and sensitivity to those in need. Bad charity has driven out
good charity. If and when bad charity comes to an end, we can
expect an explosion of interest in helping those in need.
Members of a congregation become aware of the complexity
of the problems. They come to understand the personal circum-
stances, strengths and weaknesses, and resources available to the
household. The Church offers love, personal encouragement,
creative solutions, and, when necessary, specifically catered serv-
ices and material aid. Church members can be involved in solu-
tions that strengthen marital, family and neighborhood bonds
instead of weakening them. Their goal is to help individuals live
moral lives as independent members of the Church and
community.
It is often said that what is called the "private sector" cannot
take care of the problem. It is necessary but not sufficient. But it
should not be forgotten just how powerful the forces of genuine
charity are, especially in American society.59 Moreover, the sub-
sidiarity principle doesn't specify that all solutions be private,
only that they be as close as possible to the problem at hand. For
too long, the central government has crowded out solutions that
may be offered by lower orders. Once severe budgetary changes
begin to remind people of their responsibilities to others, the
outpouring of energy may surprise all the experts. Distant gov-
ernment has no monopoly on compassion; indeed, it is compas-
sion's least able practitioner.
Being an organic part of society, a church ministry makes
the individual accountable to those who are providing the aid.
Close contact with the providers discourages irresponsible behav-
ior. This model relies on the classical view of moral tutoring
59. Id. at 241-42.
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which has two dimensions: we abstain from immoral behavior
because we fear its effects, and because we love the good.
Church-run charities hope to instill a love of the good in the peo-
ple they help. Yet clients may also fear being reprimanded or
losing services. Fear and love are both motivators. While the lat-
ter is a preferable motive, the former works as well.
VIII. SUBSIMARrIy IN AcTION
Marvin Olasky, in The Tragedy of American Compassion,60 has
detailed many of the thousands of charitable organizations that
thrived in the Nineteenth century to deal with social problems
not unlike those we confront today. Consider one case of sub-
sidiarity in action. The New York Association for Improving the
Condition of the Poor (AICP) was established in the 1840s, and
related societies appeared in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, St.
Louis, and other cities. 61 It was founded in response to the "indis-
criminate charity" of government programs, a result of govern-
ment being "bound to relieve all not otherwise legally provided
for."62 And because government programs were small, the pri-
vate system could be large and effective. The Baltimore AICP,
for example, had 2000 volunteers who made 8227 visits in 1891
to 4025 families. 3 Half of these families were headed by widows
who tended to receive material aid, most of the others were
headed by able-bodied men who were counseled on how to break
addictions from alcohol to opium, and how to get a job.'
AICP promised to "aid all those whom it can physically and
morally elevate, and no others."65 Their contributors gave of
their own resources to aid people authentically, and not to sim-
ply reinforce poverty through material subsidy. The founders
said that if the AICP fails in this discrimination and has "no
higher aim than the Alsmhouse, why should it exist at all? And
why should those already heavily taxed for the public poor
entrust funds to this charity?"66
AICP's rule was that relief should be a temporary state of
affairs. If this rule is broken, the group wrote, "many once learn-
ing to lean on public or associated relief, not only neglect to
exert the powers God has given them, but continue to call for aid
60. MARvIN OLAsiw, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992).
61. Id. at 27.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 80.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id.
SUBSIDIARITY SOCIETY, AND ENTITLEMENTS
long after it is right. This leads on the broad road to pauperism.
Individuals or societies can hardly guard too watchfully against
it."6 7 The group emphasized training and improvement of the
poor over material relief. Their volunteers visited homes to
guide in matters of religious observance and to encourage and
train the families to be thrifty, hardworking, and temperate.68
In general, they promoted four key principles: first, poverty
and pauperism, which is an unnecessary dependence, must be
distinguished; second, entitlement relief tends to pauperize
because it offers disincentives for independence and discipline;
third, a moral obligation exists for those financially independent
to become personally involved with the poor; fourth, those who
are poor due to their own character flaws must show that they are
willing to change the behavior or thinking patterns that kept
them impoverished. If they did not show that they were willing
to improve themselves, then the volunteer must leave them for a
while, return to renew the offer, and be willing to leave again if
the individuals' hearts had not changed.
Robert M. Hartley, secretary of AICP for over thirty years,
saw in alcoholism a large part of the poverty problem and a
much deeper collection of moral and spiritual problems. In
order for a person to be raised out of poverty, he sought to
"remove the causes; and these being chiefly moral-whatever
subsidiary appliances may be used-they admit only moral reme-
dies."69 Hartley quoted St. Paul's Letter to the Thessolonians:
"We hear that some of you are idle. They are not busy; they are
busy-bodies. Such people we command and urge in the Lord
Jesus Christ to settle down and earn the bread they eat."7° AICP
leaders knew that helping to elevate the poor was stressful and
often overwhelming work, which would discourage many from
participating. They realized that to most volunteers the effort
would only seem worthwhile if the goals went beyond providing
for material needs to spiritually uplift as well.71
Today, charities like AICP are less central to society, but they
do still thrive. At the Acton Institute for the Study of Religion
and Liberty, we conduct an annual Samaritan Awards Program to
award innovative private charities. One of the 1996 winners is
the Francis House in Syracuse, New York, sponsored by the Sis-
ters of the Third Franciscan Order. Francis House cares for ter-
67. Id. at 49.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 28.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 49.
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minally ill patients, including those with AIDS, who have no
family to care for them. This charity strives to provide patients
with a safe and comfortable home, companionship, and highly
individualized attention. A large component of its mission is to
minister to the spiritual needs of the residents. As an example,
one patient came to Francis House with metastasized prostate
cancer. He had only a niece and one friend to visit him. Appar-
ently influenced by the Christian love he saw in action all around
him, before his death this man decided to accept the faith and
reconcile with a daughter from whom he had been estranged.
Francis House depends upon private financing. Each resi-
dent is asked to make a contribution to cover some of his own
expenses if he is able, and the rest of the necessary funds are
raised through private and corporate donations. The cost per
resident is less than half of government-financed nursing homes
and the program is not eligible for insurance reimbursement.72
The primary caregivers are volunteers. Francis House has
emphasized that accepting government funds would bring with it
State Health Department regulations that would force it to lose
its religious and spiritual character.7"
Programs like the Francis House are not as common as they
once were because they have been supplanted by government
programs. But it is not just the private institutions which need to
be recovered. It is also the philosophy that the lower orders of
society are responsible for assisting people in time of need.
Since the advent of the welfare state, and during its growth over
the decades, we have forgotten much of the basic knowledge
from the past that was commonplace among social workers and
professional charity workers.
Mary Conyngton's 1909 book How to Help74 was a standard
reference manual for many years. In addition to being a wonder-
ful manual of practice, she points to a number of principles
which should guide any "who contemplate undertaking any char-
itable work, even though his projected activity is small."7" The
first is seriousness of purpose. "Such work means influence upon
the lives of others, for good or for ill, and no one has the right to
touch another's life carelessly or lightly."76
72. Memorandum from the Acton Institute 10 (July 15, 1996) (on file
with the author).
73. Id. at 11.
74. MARY CONYNGTON, How TO HELP: A MANUAL OF PRACrICAL CHARM
(1909).
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id.
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Another principle is "a sympathetic imagination, which will
permit the worker to share the point of view of those he is
endeavoring to help." "Whoever goes among the poor with a
preconceived idea of what is the cause of their trouble and what
should be its cure," she tells us, "is liable to meet many disap-
pointments."77 In a point which could be made against Washing-
ton's bureaucracies, she says: "The poor obstinately refuse to
form one class, all amenable to the same treatment."78 They
come from every nationality. Their standards of life and behavior
differ widely among them. The solution to each situation must
be specifically tailored to the individual in need.
Conyngton also mentions the need for "a sense of propor-
tion."79 We should seek not perfect solutions, but "the highest
practicable good attainable in each case."8 That requires look-
ing at the long run, and not just the reaching for the first avail-
able, and easiest, answer.
It seems an obvious question: in what way does the federal
welfare system perceive seriousness of purposes, imaginative solu-
tions, and a sense of proportion? The answer is obvious too: it
appears that the present system comes up with all the wrong
answers. Yet the problem of government aid was also present
when Conyngton was writing. In a section that could have been
labeled How Not to Help she has some strong comments about
public aid.8 "So long as an applicant can do anything for him-
self, or his friends can give help, it is better to refuse him public
assistance, leaving private charity to piece out his insufficien-
cies." 2 The reasons are several. "Public relief authorities must
deal with large numbers of applicants, with whom their relation
is purely official and formal."" Thus "it is not possible [for them
to] become so well acquainted with the circumstances of the
individual case as can the agents of private societies [who] bring
more of the personal element into their dealings."84 There is
also the danger that the recipient of public funds will be used as
"political capital."85
Then there is the largest danger of all, one that has become
most conspicuous in our day. "Many people," Conyngton says,
77. Id.
78. Id. at 26-27.
79. Id. at 28.
80. Id.
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"are inclined to look upon public help as a right and to apply for
it without hesitation, while they would regard themselves as a los-
ing caste if they appealed to private aid."86 That is the good
thing about private charity, and the essential moral hazard associ-
ated with public charity. (She also notes cases in Brooklyn and
Philadelphia when the number of poor declined after the aboli-
tion of public relief).87
The Art of Helping People Out of Trouble, a 1924 book by Karl
Deschweinitz, confirms how important it is that charity always
take account of a person's self worth and attempt to preserve self
respect.88 It "is the humiliation of the man who is obliged to
confess his failure to meet [his obligations] by taking as a gift the
livelihood that other men are earning for themselves. It matters
not whether the amount of money involved be great or small.
His self respect has been invaded."89 When financial difficulties
appear, says Deschweinitz, a person who helps should do every-
thing possible to help without actually giving money as a gift.
"Perhaps he can be aided to find more remunerative employ-
ment. Perhaps a wiser household management will fit his pres-
ent resources to his needs."90 Only after every other path has
been chosen should cash be available, but then only to "stimulate
his sense of responsibility."91 A top-down government welfare
system seems to reverse these priorities, giving money first, then
fostering dependency, forgetting entirely about self respect, and
then discouraging a path to independence.
The fact that some today would recoil at the acknowledge-
ment that there is a necessary link between humiliation and
incentive shows the way in which highly politicized programs
have reversed moral thinking on service to the poor. It is pre-
cisely the respect with which the poor are viewed that motivates
higher expectations from someone who can but does not sup-
port his family. Any humiliation is caused by the circumstances
not the benefactor.
The point here is not simply to condemn federal welfare,
but to highlight the long tradition of private provision, and how
much more effective it can be than the current system. Just get-
ting government out of the way as a competitor to the genuine
exercise of compassion would be a good start.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 37.
88. KARL DESCHWEINIZ, Tim ART OF HELPING PEOPLE OUT OF TROUBLE
(1924).
89. Id. at 175.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 176.
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IX. SUBSIDIARITY AND THE FUTURE OF CHARITY
The idea of devolving social responsibility to the states-
enshrined in the U.S.'s 1996 Welfare Act-is in keeping, in a
sense, with the principle of subsidiarity. The Act collects at the
central level and only then redistributes to lower levels of govern-
ment; this might be considered partial or one-way subsidiarity.
Yet while it might be a step in the right direction, it is hardly
enough. There is surely not much to be gained by replacing
Washington bureaucracies with equally intrusive government
bureaucracies in state capitols. Indeed, the primary font of social
power and authority must be in communities.
"[I]f you take power and independence from a municipal-
ity," Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "you may have docile subjects
but you will not have citizens."92 Tocqueville spoke of the bril-
liance of New England townships, but his thoughts are applicable
to communities in all parts of the U.S. Communities work
because the citizens have a close interest in them and share in
their management; we love them because we are part of them
and put our labors into them; we invest ourselves in the commu-
nity, knowing that our futures are intertwined; through them we
understand basic concepts like freedom, justice, order, charity,
enterprise, and social harmony; they help us generate practical
ideas on how to serve others, and our ties to others serve as
reminders of moral obligations.93
Yet can some of the functions of government welfare provi-
sion really be decentralized to such an extent? Can we afford to
take the risk that it will not work? Tocqueville noted that "a very
civilized society finds it hard to tolerate attempts at freedom in a
local community; it is disgusted by its numerous blunders, and is
apt to despair of success before the experiment is finished."94
We must guard against this tendency. Before we condemn local
solutions as unworkable, let's be careful not to compare the like-
lihood of local success with an idealized model of central govern-
ment programs. The socialists used to condemn the failures of
existing capitalism as compared with an idealized socialism. So it
is with the question of decentralization. The relevant compari-
son is a federal system that has failed, and a humane, local system
that, though less than perfect, will have the ability to be flexible
and learn from its mistakes.
We should remind ourselves: we cannot centrally plan
authentic charity any more than we can centrally plan the direc-
92. ALEMS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA 68-69 (1966).
93. Id. at 70.
94. Id. at 62.
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tion of the economy.9 5 We must trust private individuals, believ-
ing in the goodness of the American people to reach out to help
others, as they would be inspired to do if the government would
allow more room for the spontaneous actions of the non-govern-
ment sector. There is no need to expect a dollar for dollar
replacement of government dollars and private dollars. Private
efforts are so effective that it is not necessary.
Those people who are most generous with their time and
money in the service of others are also those who tend to be most
frustrated with the present system of welfare provision. Those
who give are mostly married, employed, college-educated, and
parents with small children, according to data from the
Independent Sector and the U.S. Labor Department. As Karl
Zinsmeister summarizes,9 6 people politically classified as con-
servative "are more than twice as likely to volunteer time for the
carrying out of good works. They also give more than twice as
big a proportion of their annual incomes to charity" than others.
Already, Americans are among the most generous people in
the world. Each year, individuals donate $125 billion to philan-
thropic efforts. Foundations give another $100 billion, and cor-
porations give $9 billion.97 The first beneficiary of the funds are
churches, which are in an excellent position to pick up where the
central state leaves off in its charitable provision. Ninety million
Americans volunteer at least three hours a week at a nonprofit
group. Nearly one million nonprofit organizations now exist and
do quite well.98
Data from 1950 to the present show that when government
spending on welfare increases (or the public perceives that it is
increasing) the percentage of personal income given to charity
decreases. The post-war peak of charitable giving, 2.6% of per-
sonal income, dates from the beginning of the Great Society.
The opposite is also true; charitable donations will increase as
governments cut back and the public is reminded of its moral
obligations to serve others.99
95. WILHELM RoPiu, AGAINST THE TIDE (1969).
96. Karl Zinsmeister, Resources to Build a World Without Welfare, WASH.
TimEs, Jan. 10, 1995, at A17.
97. U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACr (l15th ed. 1995).
98. E. Thomas McClanahan, Nonprofits: "the first line of attack," ORANGE
CouNIY REG., Nov. 23, 1994, at 9. In addition to tax reform that will promote a
growing economy, we need to make charitable giving more financially
rewarding. For example, as Peter Drucker has suggested, we could allow
individuals to deduct 110% of their charitable contributions, thereby increasing
the incentive to give. Id.
99. ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION
(1989).
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The issue is not how to expand the federal welfare state, or
even how to make it "work better," but how to make private char-
ity an effective alternative that can better achieve our shared
goals. Even in areas of health care, individual empowerment
through the private sector would appear to be the most desirable
path. Yet, whatever policy routes are taken, we should focus on
returning responsibility to individuals, churches, neighborhoods,
towns and cities. Every case of family tragedy, dependency, or
deprivation of any sort is different, and the individuals involved
have different resources, abilities, and weaknesses. A faceless
bureaucracy cannot take all of these into account. Nor can it
encourage moral renewal. What people need is not layers of
public agencies, but other human beings who have knowledge of
their real needs and a genuine commitment to help them
become responsible and independent citizens. The future is
with the private sector and its proven ability to help those in
need.
There are many practical ways that Americans today, even
though we live under a government that provides too little
opportunity, can creatively exercise the virtue of charity. This is
especially true in our communities of faith, as the existence of
hundreds of thousands of local and church-based charities dem-
onstrates. One ministry that has worked to help welfare mothers
become independent has been a buddy system, linking people in
suburban and urban churches. Support teams from the suburbs
comprised of three to six church members offer friendship, spiri-
tual and moral encouragement, practical advice, babysitting and
material help to mothers who are on welfare. Through their
friendship, many women have been able to overcome drug
dependency, find employment, and extricate themselves from
abusive relationships.1"'
There are other opportunities for helping single-parent fam-
ilies. In many urban areas, latch-key children have no one super-
vising their afterschool hours, so homework often goes
unfinished. Congregations can set up study halls in the after-
noon hours that are supervised by a teacher paid by the parish
board. Congregation members can volunteer to assist. There
can be nominal fee for recipient families. This would keep kids
off the streets and in an environment conducive to study. 10 1
100. Amy L. Sherman, The Buddy System: Personal Friendship is a Poverty-
fighting Tool, WORLD, Jan. 6, 1996, at 21.
101. Caesar A. Arredondo, Help the Poor Now: A Practical Plan,
CATHOICISM IN Csisis, Feb. 1985, at 14.
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Members can also involve themselves in abortion counseling
for women with out-of-wedlock pregnancies. Many already do,
but this ministry needs to be expanded. Volunteers in crisis
pregnancy centers present women with the true facts about abor-
tion and alternatives to it. They help mothers plan their lives
after the birth. If mothers desire to give the children up, they
introduce them to adoption agencies. Such organizations can
also provide material aid before and after the birth.
These are just a few possibilities congregations can try in
their own communities. Once the idea of the subsidiarity princi-
ple is understood, one cannot help but be impressed by how
many contemporary social and spiritual difficulties could be
addressed and even solved by paying it greater attention in our
private lives and in public affairs. Not only does subsidiarity pro-
vide for a more workable social model than the central state in
such areas as family life, welfare, education, and enterprise, it
provides a perfect opportunity for the sharing of the Gospel with
people in our own congregations and communities. A society
that recognizes subsidiarity is also a society that provides its mem-
bers the greatest possible opportunity for sharing the Good News
of the faith with others.
X. THE ENTERPRISING COMMUNITY
As a final application of the subsidiarity principle, we should
mention the general notion that the free enterprise economy is
an institution that both requires and reinforces traditional moral
concerns. Entrepreneurship is linked to the virtue of creativity.
Trade, exchange, and contract are bound up with the idea of
promise keeping. 102 Private property, the foundation of the free
market, represents the institutional embodiment of the com-
mandment to respect the private ownership of what belongs to
oneself and to one's neighbor. Even when the relations among
traders and property owners results in large institutions like mul-
tinational corporations, the subsidiarity principle is recognized
and fulfilled in institutions like individual stockholders and con-
sumers who are the main determinants of market signals like
profit and loss.103 Indeed, it is through large and complex eco-
nomic, cultural, and social networks, based on market exchange,
that the essential aim of subsidiarity can be achieved: "the estab-
lishment of true international order."10 4
102. In contrast with the state which fosters conflict see LUDWIG VON
MISES, MONEY, METHOD, AND THE MARKET PROCESS 202-14 (1990).
103. IL at 113-36.
104. CATEcHIsM, supra note 3, at para. 1885.
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The most effective welfare program is a growing economy
that operates under a social order that respects the principle of
subsidiarity. People who are able should become part of the
economy's complex division of labor, thereby offering their
unique talents to their neighbors to promote the social process
of economic production. The social forces of economic liberty
make a rise in the general standard of living more likely and per-
sonal desperation and social deprivation less likely. The achieve-
ments of free enterprise since the Industrial Revolution are
historically incomparable with any previous period. 5 In a free
enterprise system, private property provides the institutional
environment where each person can own and control the per-
sonal space around him. By private, we are suggesting not exclu-
sivity, but rather a demarcation that introduces predictability and
stability into the common destination of goods. Private is to be
contrasted with an institutional setting where the property owner
is defined as a collective entity like the state. The purpose of
property is not to acquire for oneself, but to serve others. In a
free market economy, serving others is the principal use of prop-
erty and the wealth it generates.
Some people say wealth comes through using up natural
resources, exploiting others, or through pure technological inno-
vation. But this is the exception, not the rule, under free enter-
prise. The right of exchange itself is the major contributor to
prosperity. Anytime a market exchange takes place, goods or
services of a lesser value are traded for goods or services of a
higher value. If people agree to this exchange voluntarily, then
everyone involved in the exchange is better off. It is the great
underappreciated fact of voluntary economic exchange that it
allows people to trade a less desirable state of affairs for a more
desirable one.
People must also have security in their property and the
results of their exchanges for these institutions to contribute to
the social good. When contracts are not enforced, the value of
wealth in general begins to go down. A banker cannot lend
money if there are not dependable ways of enforcing everyone's
respective obligations. A laborer will not work for a business
unless he or she knows what the terms of remuneration are
before hand. Even charity must rely on contract.
The economic system appropriate to a free and compassion-
ate society must also reward creative liberty, or what Pope John
Paul II has said is the right of economic initiative. Every person,
by being created in the image and likeness of God, has within his
105. CAPITAISM AND THE HISTORIANS (F.A. Hayek ed., 1974).
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heart and mind a capacity for thinking things anew, for renewing
the space around him, and improving society. This desire which
exists within us, and which virtue requires that we cultivate, is a
reflection of a primary attribute of God as Creator. In econom-
ics, this creative capacity is called entrepreneurship.
We are accustomed to calling charity work voluntarism, as
in, "I am volunteering my time at the soup kitchen." And cer-
tainly this term applies, but not only in this context. The diction-
ary defines voluntary as something undertaken without
compulsion or coercion. In free enterprise, all labor and entre-
preneurship is undertaken without compulsion or coercion. All
trade is voluntary and all work is voluntary. Free enterprise and
contract enforcement allows for the flourishing of a fully volun-
tary society, one where none of our labors are employed without
our consent. The free enterprise system-as distinguished from
the coercion inherent in every other system-is the economic
basis of a free society.
These institutions have permitted vast increases in wealth
over the last centuries. We have benefited so greatly that even
our standards of what we call poor have changed. Imagine a fam-
ily with no indoor toilet and no running water. They have to use
an outhouse, or some other hole in the ground, and have to boil
water from a source far away, just to get a drink or take a shower.
Would this family qualify as poor? Probably. Is there a moral
obligation to care for them, to provide for their well being?
What if charity fails? Should the government come in to care for
them, and guarantee the bare minimum standards of sanitary
conditions? Yet this description applies to more than one third
of American households in 1940. That's not in the Nineteenth
or Eighteenth century, but 1940. Only 1% are in a similar situa-
tion today. Yet it wasn't a massive government program adminis-
tered from Washington that changed matters. It was an
entrepreneurial economy.10 6
As we rediscover the principle of subsidiarity as it applies to
welfare and public policy in general, we need to reinforce these
essential institutions-private property, free exchange, contract
enforcement, and enterprise. Restrictions on the market such as
the minimum wage, excessive licensure restrictions, high taxes,
job-killing regulations, and the like, have effectively shut many
out of markets in which they should be key participants.1 0 7 Mar-
kets and property are a crucial part of the essential foundations
106. Shelby Siems, New Report Tracks Fifty Years of American Dream,
CHRISTIAN Sc. MONrrOR, Sept. 13, 1994, at 9.
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on which subsidiarity, true charity, and the peaceful social order
ultimately rest.
XI. CONCLUSION
The concept of subsidiarity should not, and cannot, be
ignored, but rather must be restored to the very center of serious
reflection on social ethics and social structure. It has both practi-
cal and moral applications to our understanding of the roles of
the state, the family, the individual, the church, educational insti-
tutions, and the enterprising economy. The centralized demo-
cratic state, managing all aspects of social and economic life,
though deeply entrenched in the modem social organization, is
a new institution, and it has exacted a heavy toll on the ability of
the lower orders of society to solve social problems. The princi-
ple of subsidiarity, on the other hand, offers a guidepost for a
new direction in the provision of social welfare and charity based
on personal responsibility. At a minimum, subsidiarity suggests
that the notion of "entitlements" must be replaced by a deeper
commitment on the part of individuals and communities to be
more involved in charitable action, and for the state which has
tended to monopolize that function to allow these lower orders
to take over the task.
The lesson that needs to be relearned is the one so beauti-
fully and plainly stated by Pope John Paul II: "A community of a
higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a com-
munity of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but
rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate
its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with the
view to the common good."108
108. CATEcHisM, supra note 3, at para. 1883.
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